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11 Introduction
A voluminous literature exists on the impacts of minimum wages on the labour market. This
literature can be seen as having two overlapping goals. The ﬁrst is to use a purportedly exogenous
shift in the price of a key factor to better understand the demand for labour and production decisions
more generally. The second is to consider the usefulness of minimum wages as a policy tool. Almost
the entire existing empirical literature on minimum wages examines the comparative static eﬀect of
a minimum wage change on employment levels and/or the shape of the wage distribution.1 In this
paper, we investigate the underlying question: how do labour market transition rates (quits, layoﬀs
and hires) diﬀer in low versus high minimum wage regimes? Answering this question provides a
diﬀerent set of insights on minimum wages as a policy tool and a new set of facts that sharpen our
understanding of the functioning of the labour market.
Recent studies of employment impacts of minimum wages take one of two main approaches.
The ﬁrst is to compare employment levels or rates across jurisdictions with diﬀerent minimum
wages using panel data at the jurisdiction level (e.g., Baker et al. (1999) for Canada, Neumark and
Wascher (2007) and the many papers cited therein for the US). The second is to use individual level
panel data to examine the impact of an increase in the minimum wage from mt at time t to mt+1
at time t+1. In particular, these latter papers examine the employment rate in t+1 for workers
whose wage lies between mt and mt+1 in period t (the group of workers most directly aﬀected by
the minimum wage increase). The minimum wage eﬀect is identiﬁed by comparing employment
changes for the directly aﬀected workers with those for workers in other jurisdictions and at other
points in the wage distribution (e.g., Currie and Fallick (1996) and Neumark et al. (2004) for the
US; Yuen (2003) and Campolieti et al. (2005) for Canada). Both types of studies tend to ﬁnd small
(negative or positive) eﬀects on employment. Our examination is closest in nature to the second
of these two approaches since we study transition rates. However, we diﬀer from those studies in
two ways. First, we examine transition rates in periods before and after minimum wage increases
not transitions at the time of a change. Thus, returning to our example where the minimum wage
increases between t and t+1, impacts measured in the second type of study includes layoﬀs between
times t and t+1, while we compare quit, layoﬀ and hiring rates between t-1 and t (i.e., in the low
1See Card and Krueger (1995) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) for comprehensive surveys of the literature.
2minimum wage regime) to quit, layoﬀ and hiring rates between t+1 and t+2 (the high minimum
wage regime). In fact, to highlight our focus, we “dummy out” transitions spanning a minimum
wage increase (transitions between times t and t+1 in this example). In addition, we focus on
workers with under a year of job tenure. This means we are explicitly not trying to follow the set of
workers directly aﬀected at the time of a hike through their careers. Instead, we are investigating
whether new hires who are hired after a minimum wage increase has occurred are treated diﬀerently
from new hires in lower minimum wage regimes. We also diﬀer from previous longitudinal studies
in that they examine whether an aﬀected worker is employed in the subsequent period, regardless of
whether they remain with the same employer while we focus on separations from a given employer.
Our results could diﬀer from those in these earlier studies to the extent that both separations and
hires change with the minimum wage.
The data we use for this exercise is the Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is
a representative, national survey whose main purpose is to generate data for oﬃcial labour force
statistics and is similar in nature to the US CPS. Importantly for us, the LFS contains a consistent
question on job tenure asked in every month back to 1976. Like the US CPS, the LFS is actually
conducted as a series of short, rolling panels with survey respondents being interviewed in each of
six consecutive months. By linking data for an individual across months, we can construct monthly
retention rates - the probability a job in existence in, say, March of a year, is still ongoing in April -
conditional on the duration of the job up to the initial month. We can also construct monthly hiring
rates as the probability a non-employed individual in March has a new job in April. We construct
these transition rates separately by province and match movements in the rates to movements in
the real minimum wage between 1979 and 2008, taking advantage of the very considerable variation
in minimum wages across time and provinces in Canada over this period. We focus on male and
female workers aged 15 to 59 with a high school or less education since we believe the minimum
wage has less relevance for higher educated workers.
Remarkably, our estimates imply an economically substantial and statistically signiﬁcant in-
crease in retention rates for low-skilled workers who have been employed for under a year in response
to a minimum wage increase. In particular, a 10% increase in the real minimum wage is associated
with approximately a 5% decline in the probability a worker separates from his or her job in the
next year. In contrast, separation rates for workers with over a year of job tenure do not vary with
3the minimum wage. When we delineate by type of separation, we ﬁnd that both quit and layoﬀ
rates are lower in high minimum wage regimes but that layoﬀ rates decline more than quit rates
and play a larger role in the overall reduction in separation rates. We also ﬁnd that hiring rates
are lower in high minimum wage regimes. Together these imply that the relatively small static
employment eﬀects typically measured are actually a reﬂection of lower hiring and layoﬀ rates after
minimum wages are raised.
At ﬁrst glance, the notion that layoﬀ rates are lower in high minimum wage regimes may seem
counter-intuitive. However, in the fourth section of the paper we outline a simple partial equilibrium
matching model with wage bargaining which conforms to the main patterns in the data: layoﬀs
are lower for recently hired workers when the minimum wage is higher while hiring rates are lower.
In the model, match-speciﬁc productivity is revealed after the worker has been with the ﬁrm for a
probationary period (say, 6 months). Once the match quality is revealed, the ﬁrm decides whether
to layoﬀ the worker. For some matches (call them minimum wage matches), productivity will be
high enough that the ﬁrm does not want to terminate the match but low enough that a bargained
wage would be below the minimum wage. Such matches earn the ﬁrm lower proﬁts than higher
productivity matches, and the proﬁtability of such matches is negatively related to the minimum
wage. Now consider a ﬁrm with a somewhat higher productivity match. The ﬁrm compares the
proﬁtability of continuing this match with the expected value of terminating the match and opening
a new vacancy. Since any new match might turn out to be a minimum wage match, when minimum
wages are higher the value of the termination option is lower and layoﬀ rates will decline. Thus, a
job in this type of model has a sunk cost feature where the sunk cost of searching is increasing in the
minimum wage. In addition, since we focus on less educated workers, one might expect that ﬁrms
pay the minimum wage during the probationary period, implying a further sunk cost that is also
increasing in the minimum wage. Finally, the fact that the expected proﬁtability of creating a new
vacancy is declining in the minimum wage implies that hiring rates will decline.2 Under this model,
ﬁrms should be less concerned about the impact of minimum wages on the expected proﬁtability
of future matches in high inﬂation periods where the real value of the minimum wage is declining.
We ﬁnd that this implication of the model is strongly conﬁrmed in the data. Nonetheless, it is
2We set out a general equilibrium version of the model in an on-line appendix (Appendix B). The conclusions
about separations are rendered more ambiguous once we allow for general equilibrium eﬀects but reduced separations
in higher minimum wage regimes are still possible.
4not our intention to claim that this is the only model that can ﬁt the data patterns we present.
We present the model to show that the data patterns can be explained within a reasonable model
which incorporates a sunk cost of hiring that is increasing in the minimum wage.
We are aware of two other papers that examine transition rates in a manner similar to what we
present. Portugal and Cardoso (2006) use rich worker-ﬁrm data to look at separations and hires of
teenagers before and after a 1987 increase in the Portuguese minimum wage. They also ﬁnd a decline
in separation rates oﬀset by a decline in hiring. They identify their eﬀects by comparing teenagers
with older workers. Our results support their ﬁndings using a stronger identiﬁcation strategy
stemming from over 140 minimum wage increases, with identiﬁcation coming from within-province
over-time variation. Dube et al. (2010) use pairs of counties across state borders in the US between
2000 and 2008 to examine minimum wage impacts on transition rates as well as on earnings and
employment levels.3 They also ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of the minimum wage on hiring and
separation rates, particularly for teenagers and in the restaurant industry. Both papers argue their
results ﬁt with a Burdett-Mortensen model, with Dube et al. (2010) providing a formal derivation
within such a model. The intuition they present based on that model is that higher minimum wages
shift up the wage distribution in equilibrium, leading to more potential workers joining the labour
force. Firms are then able to ﬁll more of their vacancies from the unemployment pool, resulting
in less raiding of other companies and, hence, fewer separations. The key distinction between our
paper and these two is our ability to delineate quits and layoﬀs. The fact that we ﬁnd much of
the reduction in separations occurs through reduced layoﬀs does not ﬁt well with an explanation
based on the Burdett-Mortensen model. We acknowledge that in equilibrium models separations
are usually mutually agreed upon by workers and ﬁrms, muddying the distinctions between quits
and layoﬀs (though in our model, with a minimum wage, some separations are clearly layoﬀs in
the sense that the minimum wage is above the ﬂow value of unemployment for some workers whose
jobs are terminated). But it is diﬃcult to believe that workers accepting outside oﬀers from other
ﬁrms would be labeled as layoﬀs in any data. Further, like us, Dube et al. (2010) ﬁnd that negative
separation eﬀects are stronger at shorter tenure but there is no reason for this to be the case in the
model they present while it is a prime feature of matching models with initially unknown match
3Dube et al. (2010) ﬁnd that controlling for county pairs rather than just jurisdiction ﬁxed eﬀects reduces the size
of their estimated eﬀects. Given this, our results may be upper bounds on the estimated eﬀects, though it is worth
noting that their separation and hiring eﬀect results remain signiﬁcant when county pair controls are included.
5productivity. Nonetheless, the mechanism proposed by Dube et al. (2010) may well provide an
explanation for the part of the separation eﬀect that does occur through quits.
Finally, there is a literature that examines minimum wage eﬀects on turnover and wage distri-
butions in the context of structural estimation (e.g., Flinn (2006) and Van den Berg (2003)). These
papers adopt a much diﬀerent empirical strategy relying on few minimum wage changes. We view
our work as complementary to those papers in the sense that it indicates directions where further
structural modeling may be useful.
The paper proceeds in ﬁve sections, including the introduction. In the second section, we
describe our data. In the third section, we present our empirical strategy and the main results. In
section four, we present a brief theoretical model to aid in understanding the empirical results and
present a further speciﬁcation indicated by the model. Section ﬁve contains conclusions.
2 Data
This section contains a brief description of the two main sources of data: provincial minimum wage
data and Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) data. We also present basic patterns of the key
variables of interest.
We use provincial minimum wage data that cover the 1979-2008 period. The minimum wage, as
with other labour matters, falls under provincial jurisdiction in Canada.4 Having each of Canada’s
ten provinces set their own minimum wage thus provides for a rich source of minimum wage vari-
ation. Some provinces have, at various points in time, adopted lower rates for special classes of
workers (e.g. students in Ontario). Yet, the evidence shows that ﬁrms do not, for the most part,
take advantage of these special categories (e.g., Card and Krueger (1995)). As such, this paper
focusses on the general adult minimum wage for each province. To match our other data, we focus
on monthly frequencies. In particular, we use the minimum wage in force on the 15th of each month
as relevant for that month to ensure compatibility with our tenure data.5
The key explanatory variable in our regression analysis is the real minimum wage. We construct
4Workers under federal jurisdiction (e.g. air transport) were the exception. Prior to 1996, there was a distinct
federal minimum wage for those workers. Yet, the federal minimum wage was relevant to only a small subset of
workers, and since 1996, the federal rate has adopted the general adult minimum wage of the province where the
employer is usually employed.
5Tenure information is asked in the week which includes the 15th of the month.
6it by deﬂating the (nominal) minimum wage by the CPI for the same province and month. Figures 1
through 3 show the real minimum wage patterns by province and year.6 Importantly, the minimum
wage shows considerable variation over time within each of the provinces.
The second source of data is the Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) master ﬁles.7 The LFS is
a large Canadian household survey involving interviews with approximately 50,000 households per
month. The focus of the LFS is to gather information on labour market activities of Canadians. A
critical variable for this study comes from the LFS tenure question which asks,“When did ...start
working for his current employer”. Based on the answer to this question, the LFS records the
number of months of employment. What distinguishes the LFS from other Canadian data sets,
and American data sets for that matter, is that this question (with no change in wording) has been
asked every month since 1976.8
We restrict our LFS sample to individuals aged 15 to 59 with a high school or less education
over the 1979-2008 period.9 We focus on high school or less educated individuals since this is the
(broad) labour market for which the minimum wage is most relevant. We further exclude full-time
students, the self-employed, and those in the military. Full-time students are not part of the study
because working is not their main activity. The self-employed and those working in the military
are removed because the processes that generate their job tenure spells are very diﬀerent from
(non-military) paid employees. Although LFS data is available as of 1976, we restrict our sample
to January 1979 onwards to match our real minimum wage data. Provincial CPI data used to
construct the real minimum wage variable is only available as of September 1978.
Our main focus in the empirical work is on transition rates in and out of employment. To
construct those rates we take advantage of the rotating panel design of the LFS. Individuals remain
in the sample for six consecutive months, and every month one-sixth of the panel is replaced. As
6For ease of presentation, the ﬁgures only show the real minimum wage as of March 15th of each year (unlike our
regression analysis where we use all months).
7These ﬁles were accessed on site at the Carleton, Ottawa, Outaouais local Research Data Centre (COOL RDC).
This RDC is run and sponsored by Carleton University, University of Ottawa, Universit´ e du Qu´ ebec en Outaouais,
in collaboration with Statistics Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and Canadian Institutes
of Health Research.
8See Brochu (2006) for a detailed discussion of the limitations of other North American data sets.
9Starting in 1990, the LFS introduced some modiﬁcations to its education questions. The focus changed from
measuring years of education to measuring educational attainment. The December 1989 transitions were excluded
from our analysis because the numerator and the denominator are not based on the same question. As a robustness
check, we repeated our analysis for those with 10 years or less of education, a group for which the eﬀect of the change
were minimal (Gower 1993). The results of our regression analysis are essentially the same.
7such, one can link consecutive months of the LFS thereby creating two-month mini panels.10 With
mini panels, the estimation of transition rates is straightforward. The March 2008 layoﬀ rate for
Ontario, for example, is estimated using only the March 2008 mini panel (i.e. the linked March-April
2008 data); it is simply the (weighted) proportion of period 1 Ontario workers who were identiﬁed
as laid-oﬀ in period 2 of the panel.11
The ﬁrst variable we investigate is the retention rate, deﬁned as the probability a person on
a job in month t is still on that job in month t+1.12 The second is the quit rate, deﬁned as the
proportion of people observed on a job in month t who are observed not to be working in month
t+1 and who respond to the question of why they separated from their last job by saying they
quit. The key problem with this deﬁnition of the quit rate is that it misses anyone who separates
from a job and ﬁnds a new job before the following month. In our second deﬁnition of the quit
rate we include in our quits both those captured under the ﬁrst deﬁnition and anyone who was on
a job in month t and employed but on a diﬀerent job in month t+1. The third dependent variable
is the layoﬀ rate, deﬁned as the proportion of people employed in month t who are not employed
in month t+1 and respond that they separated from their previous job due to a layoﬀ.13 The
fourth dependent variable is the hiring rate, which we deﬁne as the proportion of people who are
non-employed in month t who are employed in month t+1. Finally, we also present results where
we examine changes in hours of work for individuals that continue with the same employer to see
if ﬁrms adjusted the work of new hires in this dimension.
Figures 4 and 5 show the Canadian layoﬀ, quit and hiring rate patterns for the 1979-2008
period.14 As expected, quit and hiring rates are cyclical in nature, while the layoﬀ rate tends to
be counter-cyclical. Interestingly, the layoﬀ rate is systematically larger than the quit rates, even
when using the more expanded deﬁnition of quits that includes those who were on a job in month
t and employed but on a diﬀerent job in month t+1. Perhaps the most striking feature of these
ﬁgures is the rapid and substantial increase in the hiring rate in the late 1990s. This coincides with
10A detailed description of how the data was linked can be found in Appendix A.
11We use the period 1 LFS weights in estimating each transition rate.
12One can also use this data to construct retention rates through a synthetic cohort type methodology (see Brochu
(2011)). Our results using this alternate methodology are similar in nature to those presented here.
13For the period from 1999 to 2005, the LFS asked job to job switchers why they left their ﬁrst job. Using that
data, we ﬁnd that 68% of workers who transit directly to a new job by the time of the next monthly survey reported
that they quit their previous job. Thus, our second quit deﬁnition largely captures actual quitters but clearly also
includes a signiﬁcant number of layoﬀs.
14The monthly rates are averaged over each year.
8the surge in the employment rate that occurred in Canada over this period.15
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for all years combined. Table 1 shows the average
retention, quit, hiring and layoﬀ rates as well as average changes in hours of work conditional on
staying with the same employer. Table 2 focuses on hiring rates. For transitions out of employment,
initial period tenure levels clearly matter. Workers with lower levels of initial tenure are more prone
to quit or to be laid oﬀ, and as such, have a lower retention rate. One can also see some important
diﬀerences in rates across age groups. Younger workers are less likely to continue with the same
employer, but they are also more likely to be re-hired.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
For all of our dependent variables, we use the same estimation speciﬁcation, as follows:
y
g





kln(rmin)p,t−12k + Xp,tγg + 
g
p,t (1)
where yp,t is the dependent variable and ln(rmin)p,t is the log of the real minimum wage in province
p and period t. Recall that we have the following ﬁve dependent variables: the retention rate, the
quit rate (two measures), the layoﬀ rate, the hiring rate and hours worked. The vector of controls,
Xp,t, includes a complete set of provincial dummies, a dummy variable which equals 1 if there was a
minimum wage change over the upcoming month, and a full set of time dummies, corresponding to
every month of every year. We include the dummy variable for a current minimum wage increase in
order to allow us to focus on longer term equilibrium type eﬀects rather than immediate adjustments
to a minimum wage change. We present results for the cases where K = 0 (i.e. no lags) and K = 1
(i.e. using the real minimum wage lagged by one year). We have also estimated speciﬁcations with
higher lags and report on them where relevant. We use lags speciﬁed in years rather than months
because we want to examine the possibility of long term adjustments to minimum wage changes.
All our estimations are performed using weighted least squares where the weights are the inverse
of the number of individuals in the relevant “at risk” group in order to account for the fact that,
for example, the number of workers in the province of Prince Edward Island in a month is less
15Campolieti (forthcoming) ﬁnds the same patterns when applying Shimer (2007)’s more indirect method of calcu-
lating the hiring rate to Canadian data.
9than 1.5% percent of the number of workers in Ontario. We employ the g subscript in equation
(1) to emphasize that we provide separate estimates for a variety of sub-groups deﬁned by gender,
education and age.
In Table 3, we provide our base results, showing the impact of minimum wages on the retention
rate for diﬀerent initial period tenure levels. For brevity, we do not present the large set of estimated
coeﬃcient on the province, time and current period minimum wage change dummy variables. The
ﬁrst panel shows results for males and females combined. The ﬁrst column presents results not
conditioned on initial tenure level and it is apparent that the minimum wage has no impact on
retention rates for all workers combined. However, once we examine the impact for workers with
less than one year of job tenure, we ﬁnd a strongly statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of .035 on the
log real minimum wage variable. This implies that a 10% increase in the real minimum wage leads
to a statistically signiﬁcant 0.0035 increase in the retention rate for workers with high school or
less of education who have been with the same employer less than one year (where a typical one-
month retention rate for this group is on the order of 0.93). At ﬁrst glance, this may appear small
but even apparently small changes at the monthly level imply relatively large eﬀects on an annual
basis. Thus, the probability a job continues for a year if the monthly retention rate is 0.93 and
there is an equal probability of retention in each month is 0.42. If, instead, the monthly retention
rate increased to 0.934 (as the estimate suggests would arise from a 10% increase in the minimum
wage), the retention rate becomes 0.44 - an approximately 5% increase in the annual retention rate.
What is perhaps even more striking about the estimate, though, is its sign. While basic reasoning
from a standard demand and supply model might lead one to expect that retention rates will be
lower in high minimum wage jurisdictions, our estimate indicates the opposite eﬀect. As we will
see, a positive eﬀect on the retention rate is consistent with other standard theories of the labour
market.
The second set of rows in Table 3 report on a speciﬁcation including the one year lag of the
real minimum wage variable. The coeﬃcient on this lag variable is economically insubstantial and
far from statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance level. The implication is that long
term adjustments do not reverse the eﬀect of minimum wages in enhancing retention rates. In
the third and fourth columns in the table we repeat our estimations (with and without the one
year lag) for workers whose initial tenure is under six months and workers whose initial tenure is
10between 6 and 11 months. The results from these exercises reveal that the positive impacts of the
minimum wage for workers of under one year of job tenure displayed in column 2 are entirely due to
workers with tenure of under 6 months. The estimated eﬀects are neither economically substantial
nor statistically signiﬁcant for workers with 6 to 11 months of job tenure.
The tenure pattern in Table 3 matches well with regulations on notice requirements for employ-
ment termination in Canada. Most workers fall under provincial jurisdiction in terms of labour
market regulations. Termination notice varies by length of service in most provinces with many of
them having no required notice for short durations. Thus, British Columbia and New Brunswick
require no notice for jobs that have so far lasted less than 6 months, and Alberta, PEI, Ontario,
Quebec and Saskatchewan require no notice for jobs of less than 3 months duration. For all jurisdic-
tions, the required notiﬁcation period (when one is required) for jobs of under a year duration are
either one or two weeks (Kuhn 1993). Firms are required to pay a lump sum equal to the wages for
the notiﬁcation period if notice is not given. Whether or not these regulations are enough to induce
changes in ﬁrm layoﬀ behaviour, the law certainly acknowledges what is eﬀectively a probationary
period during which there is little or no implication from laying oﬀ a worker, and the results in
Table 3 indicate that minimum wage impacts on terminations occur mainly within this termination
period.
In the second and third panels of Table 3, we repeat all of these estimations separately for
men and women. The key result from these estimations is that the eﬀects of minimum wages on
retention are nearly identical for men and women. Given this, we will continue with a combined
male and female sample for the remainder of the paper.16
In Table 4, we present results for three diﬀerent age groups: ages 15-19, 20-24 and age 25-59.
The previous literature has tended to focus on teenagers as a group for whom one expects the
minimum wage to be directly relevant. In this data, we observe the strongest impacts for teenagers
but only to some extent. We observe signiﬁcant eﬀects even for the“All Tenure”sample of teenagers
compared to essentially zero eﬀects for“All Tenure”for other ages. Interestingly, though, the eﬀects
16In order to test for gender diﬀerences in the minimum eﬀect, we re-estimated equation (1) using both male and
female retention rates and adding a full set of gender interaction terms. We used a t-test for the no lag model (where
we tested the signiﬁcance of the gender-minimum wage interaction term) and an F-test (where we tested the joint
signiﬁcance of the two gender-minimum wage interaction terms). We repeated the same tests for workers with less
than one year of tenure, with 6 to 11 months of tenure and with less than 6 months of tenure. In all cases we could
not reject the null hypothesis that the minimum wage eﬀect is the same for men and women (the p-values of all test
statistics exceeded 0.7).
11for workers with under 6 months of tenure for all age groups is substantial and similar in size to that
observed for teenagers. This may arise because low educated workers who are starting a new job
tend to be low wage workers (and thus workers for whom the minimum wage is relevant) regardless
of their age.17 The more substantial “All Tenure” group eﬀect for teenagers may then just reﬂect
that a much larger proportion of teenagers has under a year of tenure.
Table 5 contains the main results in our paper: the impact of minimum wages separately for
quits and layoﬀs. In the ﬁrst panel, we present results for our conservative deﬁnition of quits
(including only those workers who responded that they were not working in month t+1 because
they quit the job they had in month t).18 For workers, with less than 1 year of job tenure, the
speciﬁcation not including any lags of the minimum wage reveals a negative estimated eﬀect of the
minimum wage on quits. This ﬁts with our Table 3 results (since retention and separation rates are
the inverse of one another) but the estimated eﬀect is only one-tenth the size of what we observed
there and is not statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level. Interestingly, when we allow
for a lagged eﬀect, the estimated coeﬃcient on the one year lag of the minimum wage is larger
and statistically signiﬁcant (though still only about 1/3 the size of the overall retention eﬀect).19
Moreover, in contrast to our overall results, the largest and most signiﬁcant eﬀects are for workers
with 6 to 11 months of tenure.
In the second panel of Table 5, we expand our deﬁnition of quits to include direct job to job
transitions. When we do this, the estimated minimum wage eﬀect when no lags are included are
statistically signiﬁcant, negative, and correspond in size to about 1/2 of the overall retention eﬀect.
Once again, the estimated eﬀect is larger for those with under 6 months of tenure, though now the
eﬀect for those with 6 to 11 months is also statistically signiﬁcant. As in the ﬁrst panel, when we
include a lag of the minimum wage, only the lag enters signiﬁcantly.20 It is worth recalling that
some of the separations counted as quits in this deﬁnition may in fact be layoﬀs, implying that these
results will bear more resemblance to results based purely on layoﬀs. Nonetheless, this deﬁnition
17The average wage for workers in our 2008 sample that have under 6 months of job tenure was $14.05 while for
all other levels of tenure it was $18.62.
18Given that minimum wage eﬀects tended to be statistically insigniﬁcant and economically insubstantial for job
tenure over a year in the previous tables, we mainly focus on results for workers with under one year of job tenure
for the remainder of the paper.
19When we allow a second year lag in the real minimum wage, the coeﬃcient on this additional lag is not statistically
signiﬁcant and the pattern presented in the table remains.
20Once again, the second lag of the minimum wage does not enter signiﬁcantly when it is introduced.
12of quits is closer to one that ﬁts with the Burdett and Mortensen type model used in Dube et al.
(2010) since that model emphasizes job to job transitions. In that sense, the results here may ﬁt
with the Dube et al. (2010) model, where reductions in quits are ultimately due to a rightward shift
induced by the minimum wage increase and where that shift takes some time to develop. But it is
worth emphasizing that minimum wage eﬀects operating through quits at best account for 1/2 of
overall retention rate movements (and for much less if we use the clean quits measure in the ﬁrst
panel), and, unlike in their model, the eﬀects are not present for all tenure levels.21
The third panel of Table 5 contains the results using the layoﬀ rate as the dependent variable.
When no lags are included in the estimation, the minimum wage coeﬃcient is negative, highly
statistically signiﬁcant and approximately 2/3 to 3/4 of the size of the eﬀect on the overall retention
rate. When a single lag is included, the estimates are nearly identical in size to those from the overall
retention rate in the initial period but the lagged value coeﬃcient is larger and positive (though not
statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance level). This suggests that minimum wage
eﬀects on layoﬀ rates are reduced by about 1/4 over the longer run. Moreover, one could account
for the pattern in the overall retention rate as due entirely to layoﬀ eﬀects in the shorter term with
oﬀsetting and smaller eﬀects from quits and layoﬀs in the longer term. We argue, based on these
patterns, that the main focus should be on layoﬀs in any attempt to understand the impact of
minimum wages on the retention rate.
The top panel in Table 6 contains elasticities calculated from the minimum wage eﬀect estimates
in Table 5. In particular, we calculate the total number of separations resulting from either quits or
layoﬀs for the province of Ontario in September of 2007 by multiplying average quit and layoﬀ rates
times employment in Ontario in that month. We then use the estimates in Table 5 to compute the
change in quit and layoﬀ rates that would arise from a 10% increase in the real minimum wage,
multiplying these by the employment level in Ontario in September, 2007 to get an estimate of the
change in the number of separations that would result from a minimum wage increase. The entries
in the table show these calculated changes in separations as a proportion of the total number
of separations. The ﬁrst panel carries out this exercise using the ﬁrst deﬁnition of quits while
the second repeats the exercise for the deﬁnition of quits that includes job to job transitions.22
21In the estimation using the second deﬁnition of quits with no minimum wage lags for workers from all tenure
levels, the minimum wage coeﬃcient is -.0011 with a standard error of .0013.
22As mentioned earlier, data from the 1997-2005 period indicates that 68% of job to job transitions recorded in the
13The total elasticity (quits and layoﬀs) implies that a 10% increase in the minimum wage implies
approximately a 2.6% reduction in separations from jobs with less than one year of tenure and
approximately a 1% decline in separations from jobs of all tenures.23 Of this, at least two-thirds
(and for most tenure length- quit deﬁnition combinations a much larger proportion) is due to the
eﬀect on layoﬀs. A reasonable characterization of the results in Table 6 is that an increase in the
minimum wage has non-trivial eﬀects in reducing separations (especially at short tenure) and that
the majority of these eﬀects happen through reductions in layoﬀs.
The second panel of Table 6 repeats this exercise for teenagers. As in the retention rate results
in Table 4, we see here that the results for teenagers and the all-age results are very similar for
tenure under 1 year but the teenage results are much larger for the all tenure sample. As in the
ﬁrst panel, layoﬀs account for approximately 90% or more of minimum wage eﬀects when we use
the most restrictive quit deﬁnition and approximately 60% of eﬀects when we use the (adjusted)
broader quit deﬁnition.
In Table 7, we examine results for other employment related outcomes. In the top panel, we
examine the impact of minimum wages on hiring rates for various demographic groups. The both
genders combined results in the ﬁrst column indicate that increasing the minimum wage reduces
hiring rates by an economically substantial and statistically signiﬁcant amount. The second set of
rows show that the lagged minimum wage does not have an economically substantial or statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Thus, what we are capturing is a long run move toward lower hiring rates
after a minimum wage is raised. In the speciﬁcation without a lagged minimum wage, the negative
hiring eﬀect appears to be substantially smaller for females but this gender diﬀerence disappears
once we include a lag. Again, the data seem to point toward similar impacts by gender. The
negative hiring eﬀects of a higher minimum wage regime are, however, much stronger for teenagers.
Thus, in a higher minimum wage regime, teenagers have both substantially higher retention rates
and substantially lower hiring rates relative to other workers. The fact that the age diﬀerential
in hiring rates appears to be larger than that in retention rates ﬁts with results in the literature
data are quits while the rest are layoﬀs. We apportion the calculated change in separations for quit2 to quits and
layoﬀs based on this. Even without this reapportioning, layoﬀs constitute 60% of separations when using the quit2
results.
23Note that when we use the ﬁrst quit deﬁnition, job to job transitions are not counted among the separations and
so the denominator in the calculations - the total number of separations - is smaller. This is the reason the calculated
elasticities are approximately the same even though the estimated coeﬃcients for quit2 are larger.
14showing that minimum wages have negative eﬀects on employment levels for teenagers but not for
older workers.
In the lower panel of Table 7, we show estimates of impacts on average weekly hours of work for
workers with diﬀerent levels of tenure. One might hypothesize that minimum wage impacts show
up to some extent in reductions in weekly hours rather than in employment changes. In fact, the
table indicates that there is no evidence of an impact on hours in higher minimum wage regimes.
This is true regardless of the individual’s tenure level.
3.1 Employment Rate Implications
A natural question is the implication for the overall employment rate of the changes in separation
and hiring rates induced by a change in the minimum wage. To answer that, we can consider two
regimes - one with average hiring, layoﬀ and quit rates for Ontario for the year 2007 and one where
we use the estimated eﬀects from Tables 5 and 7 in conjunction with a 10% real increase in the
minimum wage to calculate new, counterfactual rates of separation and hiring. We then use the
rates from both scenarios to construct the average level of the employment rate in each regime and,
from that, the impact of the minimum wage increase on the employment rate.
We calculate the employment rate as the equilibrium rate under the assumption that ﬂows into
employment equal ﬂows out. Thus, the equilibrium rate equals hr/(hr + sr), where hr is the hiring
rate and sr is the separation rate. We compute the separation rate as the sum of the layoﬀ rate plus
the quit rate. Speciﬁcally, we use what we call the quit1 rate that does not include direct job to
job transitions since we only need ﬂows out of employment. For all ages, the implied employment
rate in the base scenario is 69%. This compares favourably with the actual employment rate of
66.6% for high school dropouts and graduates aged 15 to 54 (both sexes) in Ontario in 2007. The
calculated minimum wage impact implies that a 10% increase in the real minimum wage generates
a 0.76% decline in the employment rate with an associated standard error of 0.50. In comparison,
for teenagers, the calculated minimum wage eﬀect is -1.7% with a standard error of 0.9.24
To check on the comparison of these calculated minimum wage impacts with more standard
estimates for Canada, we implemented a standard speciﬁcation using Canadian provincial data for
24The implied base equilibrium employment rate for teenagers is 62%, which is higher than the average employment
rate of 50.7% for high school grads and dropouts aged 15 to 24 in Ontario in 2007. The fact that we drop full-time
students in our sample but they are included in the published statistics could account for this diﬀerence.
15our same sample period (1979 to 2008). Speciﬁcally, we regressed age speciﬁc employment rates
on the real minimum wage, a lag of the minimum wage variable, and a complete set of year and
province dummies. For the regressions for teenagers we also included the proportion of the provincial
population who were teenagers and the adult male unemployment rate. This speciﬁcation has been
used in numerous previous papers (see Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a recent comprehensive
survey of the minimum wage literature). The results from these estimations implied that a 10%
increase in the minimum age would lead to a statistically signiﬁcant 2.5% decline in the teenage
employment rate and a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.5% decline for the overall employment rate.
These are in substantial agreement with earlier estimates in the literature and ﬁt well with our
calculated impacts on the equilibrium rate. Our results indicate that the small net eﬀect on the
overall employment rate reﬂects oﬀsetting negative eﬀects of a minimum wage increase on hiring
and layoﬀ rates. For teenagers, the more substantial negative net eﬀect reﬂects the fact that, for
them, the negative impact on hiring substantially outweighs the negative eﬀect on layoﬀs.
4 An Illustrative Model
To this point, we have found, examining a substantial amount of data on quits, layoﬀs and hires,
that both separation and hiring rates are lower in higher minimum wage regimes. Importantly, the
reduction in separations occurs mainly in the ﬁrst 6 months of a job and mainly through a reduction
in layoﬀs. In this section, we brieﬂy describe a partial equilibrium model of ﬁrm decision making
which captures these main features of the data and provides some intuition for them. The model
is a search and matching model similar in spirit to Flinn (2006) but with endogenous separations.
In an on-line (Appendix B), we present a general equilibrium version of the model to emphasize
that the main eﬀects of higher minimum wages set out here are also present in general equilibrium.
Since the main intuition is easier to see in the partial equilibrium setting, we present the more
restrictive model here and provide a brief description of general equilibrium results afterward.
Consider a matching model in which each operating ﬁrm employs one worker. Workers and
ﬁrms meet according to some matching technology but do not know the ultimate productivity of
the match when they ﬁrst meet. The productivity, η, which is a random variable with associated
cumulative distribution function F, is match speciﬁc and is not revealed until after the worker has
16worked for the ﬁrm for a brief probationary period. During the probationary period, workers are
paid a function of the minimum wage, m, denoted as c(m). Once the match quality is revealed, the
match is dissolved if the productivity is suﬃciently low. Otherwise it continues and the ﬁrm and
worker bargain over a wage to divide the match speciﬁc surplus according to a Nash bargaining
rule. Firms also pay a ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, z, and ﬁrms and workers face a common
discount rate, r. In the partial equilibrium setting, we will discuss the separation decision as if it
is made unilaterally by the ﬁrm and call the separations layoﬀs. As we discuss later, in general
equilibrium, the decision to dissolve a match is, in fact, jointly agreed upon in most, but not all,
situations.
The matching function determining ﬁrm and worker meetings is a function of labour market
tightness, θ = V
U (V = the number of vacancies and U = the number of unemployed workers). The
matching probability implies a probability of a ﬁrm ﬁlling a vacancy, φ, and a probability of an
unemployed worker meeting a vacancy, ψ. There is no on-the-job search. Matches end according to
an exogenous probability, δ, but will also be terminated endogenously when η is revealed in some
cases. In the partial equilibrium version of the model, we will take θ as ﬁxed.
The key intuition in the model can be obtained by examining the ﬁrm Bellman equations, with
the equation corresponding to a vacancy for any ﬁrm being given by
rΠv = −z + φF(Πe
e − Πv) − φc(m) (2)
where, Πv is the value of a vacancy and Πe
e is the expected value of a ﬁlled job. Note that the
training cost, c(m), is only incurred if there is a match and, therefore, is multiplied by φ. Note,
also, that φF is the probability a match is made and continues. That is, φF = φ×Probability (the
match speciﬁc productivity is high enough to warrant continuing).
Workers are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their ﬂow value of being unemployed,
bj, where j indexes the worker. This is reﬂected in each worker having a reservation wage, w∗
j, such
that he or she prefers the unemployed state to being employed with a wage below w∗
j. Because of
this, the bargaining solution, and with it, proﬁts, will vary with the speciﬁc worker with whom the
ﬁrm matches. The value of a vacancy ﬁlled by worker j and with a realized draw, η, is determined
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rΠej(η) = η − wj(η) + δ(Πv − Πej(η)) (3)
where wj(η) is the wage bargained when a ﬁrm meets worker j. wj(η) is replaced by m in the value
function when wj(η) < m.
We will assume a speciﬁcation for ﬁrm entry that follows Fonseca et al. (2001) (and Beaudry
et al. (2011)). In particular, we assume that each worker has a probability of turning into an
entrepreneur, Ω. If a worker becomes an entrepreneur, she draws a value for the ﬁxed cost of
creating a vacancy from a cumulative distribution function, G. Entrepreneurs with a ﬁxed cost
below πv will open a vacancy and search for a worker to ﬁll it. This model allows for free entry in
the sense that entrepreneurs enter until the marginal entrant has zero expected proﬁts, but the value
of a vacancy is not driven to zero by competition, which will be important in the considerations
that follow.
Given that Πei is increasing in η while Πv is not a function of η, we can deﬁne reservation values
of η, η∗
j, such that a match with worker j is terminated if η < η∗
j. In particular, deﬁne η∗
j as the
value of η at which Πej = Πv with a wage just equals j’s reservation wage, w∗
j. Returning to (3),
this implies that η∗
j is deﬁned by,
η∗
j = rΠv + w∗
j (4)
i.e., η∗
j is the productivity level that just covers the sum of the worker and ﬁrm outside options.
Understanding how the minimum wage aﬀects terminations reduces to understanding its impact
on the η∗
j’s. In our partial equilibrium examination of ﬁrm actions, we take w∗
j as ﬁxed, and so
movements in η∗
j are determined by movements in Πv.
In Appendix B, we derive an expression for Πv. From (2), Πv depends crucially on the expected
value from a ﬁlled position, Πe
e. Proﬁts from an actual match and expected proﬁts from potential
matches depend, in turn, on the type of worker a ﬁrm meets. In particular, it is relevant to divide
workers into two types: those with a ﬂow value of unemployment that implies that their reservation
wage is below the minimum wage and those with a reservation wage above the minimum wage. For
the ﬁrst group, m replaces w∗
j in (4), implying a common value for the reservation productivity,
η∗
m for all matches with this group.25 We can also deﬁne ˆ ηj as the value of ηj such that a ﬁrm and
25As a side point, there will be some matches for this group with η < η
∗
m where ﬁrms and workers would agree to
18worker j would just bargain a wage equal to m. Thus, for η∗
m ≤ ηj < ˆ ηj the match will continue
with the worker receiving the minimum wage.26 These matches will be generate lower ﬂow proﬁts
for the ﬁrm than non-minimum wage matches.
Now we are in a position to discuss the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on ﬁrm
separation decisions. For all ﬁrms, an increase in the minimum wage reduces Πe
e, the expected
proﬁts from a ﬁlled vacancy (and with it the value of opening a vacancy) both because they must
pay all minimum wage workers more and because some matches where the value of η implied the
bargained wage was formerly above m will now be covered by the minimum wage. Moreover, the
cost of paying a new worker during the probationary period increases with m, further reducing the
value of opening a new vacancy. To understand the implications of this, we need to distinguish
between two types of matches. For matches with high reservation wage (w∗
j > m) workers, the
minimum wage is not directly relevant since the worker would not stay in a match with a wage as
low as m. This means a minimum wage increase only has an indirect impact through the reduction
in the value to the ﬁrm of terminating the current match and opening a new vacancy.27 Returning
to (4), the reduction in Πv implies a reduction in η∗
j and, with it, in terminations. Essentially,
having already matched with a worker and having sunk the cost of paying for the probationary
period, the higher is the minimum wage, the more likely is the ﬁrm to want to maintain the current
match than go back, re-pay the probationary period costs and potentially end up in a lower proﬁt,
minimum wage match.
The second type of matches are those with low reservation wage workers. In this case, the
marginal match will be one which pays the minimum wage. Thus, an increase in the minimum
wage will have both the indirect eﬀects (through a reduction in Πv) and a direct eﬀect on the
ﬂow proﬁts of the marginal match. The latter eﬀect will imply an increase in η∗
m, as can be seen
by replacing w∗
j with m in (4). The direct eﬀect should dominate, implying an increase in layoﬀs
continue the match with a wage below m if they were allowed to do so. However, with ﬁrms constrained to pay m,
they terminate the match. In this case, the separation is clearly a layoﬀ since the worker would prefer to continue
with the match given that m > w
∗
j.
26ˆ ηj is indexed by j since it depends on the worker’s value of unemployment.
27It is at this point that the ﬁrm entry speciﬁcation becomes relevant. In standard versions of search models there
is a perfectly elastic supply of potential ﬁrms and Πv is always driven to zero. In that case, there would be no
possibility of a change in m changing Πv. With the speciﬁcation set out here, the elasticity of supply of entrepreneurs
is determined by the shape of the G distribution. If the supply is less than perfectly elastic then Πv is non-zero and
can be aﬀected by m. Beaudry et al. (2011) present evidence that the supply of entrepreneurs, and with it the job
creation curve in a standard search model, is relatively inelastic with respect to changes in wage costs.
19for this group when m rises. Whether the ultimate impact on layoﬀs is negative or positive then
depends on the relative numbers of matches of each type and is an empirical matter.
In general equilibrium, we allow for changes in both θ and w∗
j in response to a minimum wage
increase. The impact on worker reservation wages will be positive as low reservation wage workers
will beneﬁt directly from the higher value for m and all workers beneﬁt indirectly because they are
able to bargain for better wages with ﬁrms who, as we have seen, have weakened outside options.
This eﬀect makes workers pickier, which tends to reduce θ as workers stay unemployed longer. At
the same time, with a reduced value for vacancies, fewer vacancies are created, which also drives θ
down. Thus, in equilibrium, the model predicts a lower observed probability of unemployed workers
matching with ﬁrms (what we called the hiring rate in the empirical work earlier). In terms of the η∗
j
values, the implications become more uncertain in general equilibrium. While ﬁrms, as described
above, have an increased inclination to continue with matches, the improved outside option for
workers implies that they are more likely to want matches to terminate. Again, the actual outcome
in terms of separations is an empirical matter.
4.1 An Empirical Implication
The model has a simple empirical implication which can be checked in the data. An increase in the
minimum wage has two, oﬀsetting eﬀects on layoﬀs in the model. The ﬁrst is a direct eﬀect whereby
less productive matches are eliminated (η∗
m increases), leading to an increase in layoﬀs. This is an
immediate eﬀect stemming from comparisons of the current minimum wage to productivity draws
on the current job. The second is the eﬀect through reducing expected proﬁts from future matches
if the current match is dissolved and the ﬁrm opens a new vacancy. This eﬀect reduces layoﬀs and
it is about expectations. The latter eﬀect will be smaller if minimum wages are expected to be
lower in future, which would be the case in high inﬂation periods. Thus, the model predicts that
inﬂation will reduce layoﬀs through the direct channel (because the current real minimum wage is
lower) but should also diminish the expectations related eﬀects of the minimum wage. We already
capture the ﬁrst channel because we use the real minimum wage in our estimation. The second
inﬂation eﬀect would be reﬂected in an interaction between the inﬂation rate and the real minimum
wage variable. The coeﬃcient on that interaction should be positive: in high inﬂation periods the
layoﬀ reducing eﬀect of minimum wage increases should be lessened. This is not an implication of
20other potential models of minimum wages and transitions.28
Table 8 contains the results from speciﬁcations involving the inﬂation interaction. The inﬂation
rates used in the estimation are province speciﬁc. Given the inclusion of a full set of time dummies,
the eﬀect of this interaction is identiﬁed from relative diﬀerences in inﬂation within provinces over
time. We include the inﬂation rate both directly and in interaction with the real minimum wage
variable. The inﬂation rate on its own results in statistically signiﬁcant increases in the retention
rate and declines in the layoﬀ rate. Its impact on the quit rate is smaller than for the layoﬀ rate and
generally not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels. These
results ﬁt broadly with a model in which ﬁrms cannot easily cut nominal wages and higher inﬂation
allows for declines in real wages that can result in ﬁrms not laying oﬀ workers. The interaction
term implies a strongly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of inﬂation in the direction of mitigating the
positive eﬀect of the real minimum wage on the separation rate. Again, this eﬀect arises almost
entirely through layoﬀs, with higher inﬂation periods being associated with a less negative impact
of the real minimum wage on the layoﬀ rate. The fact that the inﬂation impact occurs through
layoﬀs but not, for the most part through quits, ﬁts with the model, which provides an explanation
for this interaction based on ﬁrm layoﬀ behaviour. There is no apparent reason why quits should
respond to the inﬂation regime in this way and, in that sense, these results lend more support
to models that emphasize layoﬀs rather than quits as the channel through which minimum wages
reduce the separation rate.
The results in Table 8 imply very substantial impacts of the real minimum wage on layoﬀ
rates in low inﬂation regimes. Thus, for example, with an inﬂation rate of 2% (close to Canada’s
average over the last decade), a 10% increase in the real minimum wage implies a 3.9% decline
in the separation rate due to layoﬀs for jobs with tenure under 1 year. This compares to the
overall average of a 2.3% decline shown in Table 6 and to a zero eﬀect if the inﬂation rate reaches
approximately 10%. Thus, the results in this table both provide support for the model and imply
that the impact of minimum wages on layoﬀs are even more substantial in recent times than what
is shown in the earlier tables.
28For example, in the Burdett-Mortensen type model presented in Dube et al. (2010), the negative eﬀect of a
minimum wage increase on separations occurs because it induces a greater supply of applicants for high wage ﬁrms.
This, in turn, reduces their need to raid lower wage ﬁrms for workers, reducing separations from the latter ﬁrms.
There is no reason within the model for this eﬀect to vary with the inﬂation rate, assuming the minimum wage
variable is already properly deﬂated.
21While the inﬂation interaction results ﬁt with the implications of our model, we would not
argue that the matching model presented here is the only model capable of predicting our data
patterns. In an eﬃciency wage model, for example, an increase in the ratio of the minimum wage
to the average wage in the economy could reduce shirking and, therefore, terminations associated
with a worker caught shirking. Whether this would be associated with an increase or decrease in
hiring is unclear without putting more structure on the model.29 Other models may also serve to
rationalize our empirical results.30 The key point is that standard models can imply that minimum
wages shift the equilibrium in a labour market in such a way that the nature of ﬂows into and out
of employment are altered even if the net impact on the employment rate is small.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether and how employment transitions diﬀer in high versus low
minimum wage regimes. We do this using data from the Canadian Labour Force Survey which has
a consistent question on job tenure throughout our sample period (1979-2008). This allows us to
take advantage of the fact that the minimum wage is set at the provincial level in Canada, resulting
in over 140 minimum wage changes in our period. We focus on low educated workers throughout.
Working with this data, we ﬁnd that higher real minimum wage regimes are associated with lower
job separation rates and lower hiring rates, with both eﬀects being economically substantial and
statistically signiﬁcant. Our most important result is that the reduction in separation rates is driven
mainly by a reduction in layoﬀs rather than quits. We also ﬁnd that this reduction occurs mainly in
the ﬁrst six months of a job and that the size of the eﬀect at the outset of a job is similar across age
groups (including teenagers) and between genders. In the fourth section of the paper, we present
a search and matching model which implies that ﬁrms operating in the low skilled labour market
reduce layoﬀs because their expected proﬁts from terminating the current match and starting a
29Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) examine minimum wage eﬀects in an eﬃciency wage model. In their model there is
a reduction in shirking but, because they assume that the proportion of shirkers who are caught is decreasing in the
size of the ﬁrm, it also implies an increase in hiring.
30Acemoglu (2001) investigates a search and bargaining model in which ﬁrms can create one of two types of
vacancies: lower productivity-low wage jobs (bad jobs) or higher productivity-high wage jobs (good jobs). A minimum
wage above the bad job sector wage but below the wage in the good sector will reduce relative proﬁts in the bad
job sector and cause a shift in composition toward good jobs. Such a model might be extended to include more
investment by ﬁrms in workers in good jobs and, with it, lower layoﬀs similar to the mechanism in Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999).
22new one are lower when the minimum wage is higher. This model has an implication for diﬀerences
in the minimum wage eﬀect with the inﬂation rate which we ﬁnd is supported in our data. Once
those inﬂation eﬀects are taken into account, we ﬁnd that a 10% increase in the real minimum
wage when the inﬂation rate is 2% (which is near the rate for Canada for the last decade) implies
a decline in separations occurring through layoﬀs of 3.9%.
Taken as a whole, these results imply that a higher minimum wage regime is associated with
signiﬁcantly lower hiring rates and lower layoﬀ rates, particularly in the ﬁrst six months of a job.
For the workforce as a whole, these eﬀects almost exactly oﬀset one another, resulting in no net
impact on the employment rate. This ﬁts with standard estimations of the impact of minimum wage
changes on the overall employment rate for all age groups. Policy makers then face a choice between
a high minimum wage regime where workers take longer to ﬁnd a job but have greater job stability
once they match with a ﬁrm versus a low minimum wage regime where workers move more quickly
through both unemployment and employment spells. Based on this, the key question becomes
which regime is associated with higher welfare. The answer to that will depend in part on worker
preferences about job stability versus being unemployed. It will also depend on whether greater
job stability is associated with greater investment in ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital. The ultimate
welfare impact is beyond the scope of this paper, but the similarity of the estimated impacts across
age and gender groups imply that these welfare implications are important for the entire spectrum
of low skilled workers. In contrast, estimations focusing just on the net employment rate impact
(and ignoring impacts on the underlying gross transition rates) would lead one to conclude that
minimum wages have little impact on most workers older than teenagers.
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In this appendix we provide more details information on the LFS, and in particular, the construction
of our mini panels.
The LFS has a rotating panel design where households remain in the sample for six consecutive
months. Every month 1/6 of the sample is replaced by households in a similar area. Although it
has panel features, it is not a panel data set per se; the LFS is oﬃcially designed to produce cross
sectional samples. As such, it follows dwellings, and not individuals (households). If an individual
changes dwelling, he is out of the reach of the survey.
The LFS also does not have a single person identiﬁer variable. Fortunately, we can uniquely
identify individual across monthly ﬁles using a combination of variables—all of which are provided
by the LFS. Changes over time in geographical identiﬁers (e.g. EI regions) have meant that diﬀerent
identifying variables must be used for diﬀerent periods. We provide both a short description of the
variables and also its name (in capital letters) as identiﬁed in the LFS codebook. For the 1976 to
1983 period, one must use the month, the regional oﬃce (REGOFF), the unique household identiﬁer
within a regional oﬃce (DOCKET), and the unique person identiﬁer within a household (LINE)
variables. For 1984 to 1986, one must rely on the month, the economic regions (ERTAB), the
census metropolitan areas and urban centres (CMATAB), the REGOFF, the DOCKET, and the
LINE variables. For 1987 to 1995, it is the month, the ERTAB, the CMATAB, the unemployment
insurance region (UIRTAB), the REGOFF, the DOCKET, and the LINE variables. Finally, for
1996 onwards one must use the month, the one-digit province code (PROV1), the pseudo UIC
regions (PSEUDOUI), the regional strata (FRAME), the super-stratum (STRAFRAM), the sample
design type (TYPE), the ﬁrst-stage sampling unit (CLUST), the rotation number (ROTATION),
the number assigned to dwellings within a cluster (LISTLINE), the multiple dwelling code for
structures that have more than one dwelling (MULT), and the LINE variables.
We dropped individuals that had incompatible tenure spells across the two periods of the panel.
For an individual that worked in period 1, she must have one more month of tenure in period 2
(i.e. continued with the same employer), one month of tenure in period 2 (i.e. started a new job),
or no job tenure in period 2 (i.e. is out of work). Finally we also dropped that transitioned to
self-employment.
Appendix B: Theoretical Model (For Online Publication Only)
The Environment
Consider an environment in which there is a ﬁxed set of ﬁrms, with each active ﬁrm hiring one
worker. When a ﬁrm matches with a worker, there is a match-speciﬁc productivity draw, η, of a
mean zero random variable with associated CDF, F. Importantly, the value of η is not revealed
until after the ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed training cost. We will think of that cost as corresponding to a
period in which workers add nothing to output but must be paid the minimum wage, m, though
we model it simply as a ﬁxed cost, c(m). Firms also pay a ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, z, and
ﬁrms and workers face a common discount rate, r.
Firms and workers meet according to a matching function which is a function of labour market
tightness, θ = V
U (V = the number of vacancies and U = the number of unemployed workers). The
matching probability implies a probability of a ﬁrm ﬁlling a vacancy, φ, and a probability of an
unemployed worker meeting a vacancy, ψ. There is no on-the-job search. Matches end according to
an exogenous probability, δ, but will also be terminated endogenously when η is revealed in some
cases.





and has an associated CDF, H.
The Bellman equation corresponding to a vacancy for a ﬁrm is
rπv = −z + φF(πe
e − πv) − φc(m) (5)
where, πv is the value of a vacancy and πe
e is the expected value of a ﬁlled job. Note that the
training cost, c(m), is only incurred if there is a match and, therefore, is multiplied by φ. Note,
also, that φF is the probability a match is made and continues. That is, φF = φ × Probability






j dFdH, and η∗
j is the reservation value of η such that matches with η < η∗
j are
terminated. We will discuss the notion that this problem is characterized by having a reservation
property in the next section.
The value of a vacancy ﬁlled by worker j and with a realized draw, η, is determined by
rπej(η) = η − wj(η) + δ(πv − πej(η)) (6)
where wj(η) is the wage bargained when a ﬁrm meets worker j. We assume the wage is determined
by a Nash bargaining solution to the problem of dividing the surplus from a match. Note that the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts are indexed by j because diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent outside options, implying
diﬀerent surpluses from the match.
For workers, the Bellman equation corresponding to unemployment is given by,






where Vujis the value of being unemployed, V e
ej is the expected value from employment, ψ is the
probability the worker meets a vacancy, and ψF = ψ
R ∞
η∗
j dF is the probability a worker meets a
match that is ultimately completed.
The Bellman equation related to employment is
rVej(η) = wj(η) + δ [Vuj − Vej] (8)
The total surplus to the match is,
Sj(η) = πej(η) + Vej(η) − πv − Vuj (9)
Since the worker’s and ﬁrm’s outside options are independent of η and the beneﬁts to the match
are increasing in η, there exists an η∗
j at which the match surplus is zero. Matches with η < η∗
j are
terminated.
Using (6) and noting that rVuj deﬁnes a reservation wage, w∗




That is, if a ﬁrm just pays the worker his or her reservation wage, η∗
j is the productivity of the
match where ﬂow proﬁts just equals the ﬂow value of the ﬁrm terminating the match and opening
a new vacancy. Note that the left hand side of (10) does not have a j subscript so any increase in
w∗
j (i.e., rVuj) is exactly oﬀset by an increase in η∗
j
25Partial Equilibrium Impacts of the Minimum Wage on Terminations
Within this model, the interesting termination activity relates to the endogenous decision not to
continue with matches where η is below η∗
j. Our interest, in particular, is in the impact of the
minimum wage, m, on terminations, which reduces to understanding its impact on η∗
j. Apart from
its role in determining the costs of training, the minimum wage is only relevant in bargaining if it
is higher than rVuj for at least one worker, and we assume this is the case.
We begin by considering eﬀects in partial equilibrium (where θ is constant), and proceed by
substituting an expression for rπv in terms of basic parameters into (10). Returning to (5), this
involves getting an expression for πe
e. To do this in the presence of a minimum wage, we need to
consider two types of workers: those whose reservation wage is above and those whose reservation
wage is below m. Thus, deﬁne bmas the value of bj such that rVuj = m , (given current market






δπv + E(η | η > η∗
m) − m




− E(w | η > ˆ ηl)








[δπv + E(η | η > η∗
l ) − E(w | η > η∗
l )]dH − δπe
e
where, η∗
m is the reservation productivity draw that allows a ﬁrm to just cover the minimum
wage plus rπv. Notice that this is the same for all pairs where rVuj < m and implies more layoﬀs
than would arise without a minimum wage. ˆ ηl is the value of ηl such that a ﬁrm and worker l
would just bargain a wage equal to m. Thus, for η∗
m ≤ ηl < ˆ ηl the match will continue with the
worker receiving the minimum wage. ˆ ηl is indexed by l since it depends on the worker’s value of
unemployment.
For workers with b > bm, the minimum wage does not have a direct eﬀect on decisions because
no such worker would ever be paid that minimum wage (since it is below his or her reservation
wage). η∗
j in this case is deﬁned in (10). Note that m will still have an indirect eﬀect for matches




r + δ + φF
(−z − φc(m))+ (12)
φF
r + δ + φF
Z bm
b
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l )dH
Now, consider matches involving a worker with b < bm. In this case, rearranging 6) gives
η∗
m = rπv + m (13)
which implicitly deﬁnes η∗



































. An increase in ηm reduces the value of a vacancy because it means more
initial matches are rejected (after incurring the search and training costs) but increases that value
because the expected value of ongoing matches is now higher. By the envelope theorem, these





























where A is the term [] in (12) which equals (r+δ)πe
e. Since hiring costs, c, are increasing in m, the
ﬁrst term on the right side of (15) is negative. In addition, expected proﬁts for a ﬁrm will decline as
it both must pay all minimum wage workers more and some matches where the value of η implied
the bargained wage was formerly above m will now be covered by the minimum wage. Combined,
these imply that ∂rπv
∂m < 0. Thus, the sign of
∂η∗
m
∂m is uncertain. On one side, the increase in m
implies the marginal η that just covers m plus the outside option of the ﬁrm is now higher. On the
other side, once a match is formed (and the training cost paid), a rise in m implies a lower outside
option for the ﬁrm since dissolving the current match means incurring the new, higher training cost
when the new vacancy is ﬁlled. This will push the value for η∗
m down. In general, we would expect




Alternatively, for workers with b > bm, rearranging (10) yields,
η∗

















































where we assume all agents recognize that η∗
jwill increase for all matches.




, we need an expression for w∗
j = rVuj
as well. This is done in a similar fashion to obtaining to obtaining rπv and involves getting an














r + δ + ψF
bj +
ψF
r + δ + ψF
E(wj | η > η∗
j). (18)
Note that since we are considering workers with b > bm, they will never be paid m and therefore
an increase in m will have eﬀects through changes in the probability of ﬁnding a job (ψF) and on
the bargained wage. With the value of a vacancy falling as m increases, workers will be able to
bargain higher wages.
























r + δ + ψF

−bj + E(wij | η > η∗
ij)

The expected value of wages in matches that are continued will exceed bj and therefore this
derivative is positive. An increase in η∗ will imply a lower probability of a continuing match so
∂ψF
∂η∗ < 0. Thus, the term before the plus sign on the right of (18) is negative. The second term will
be positive but less than 1. Together these imply that
∂w∗
j
∂η∗ < 0. This implies the denominator of




m term is the same as before: expected proﬁts from a
new match will decline both because of rises in training costs and because ﬁrms will get less proﬁt
from matches with low b workers. In fact, this negative impact on rπvwill arise even if training
costs are not a function of m. On the other side, the expected value of employment would rise for
workers (holding η∗ constant), implying that w∗
j will increase. Thus, the net eﬀect of a rise in m
on η∗ is ambiguous but it is certainly possible that ﬁrm concerns about future hiring costs may
dominate and drive η∗ down. This contacts with eﬀects for low b workers where we would expect
more layoﬀs (a higher η∗). Finally, a rise in m implies a rise in bm and more workers in the latter
category, moving the overall average eﬀect toward more layoﬀs. Ultimately, though, which eﬀect
dominates is an empirical matter.
Determining Tightness and Hiring
We next turn to considering the problem in general equilibrium. This means allowing labour market
tightness to be endogenous. To do this, we ﬁrst make the environment richer by adding assumptions
about workers and entrepreneurs, who will determine job creation. Assume there are L workers in
the economy each endowed with a value of b. Workers have an option of staying out of the labour
market which has a value of zero. Thus, only workers with rVu>0 will enter the work force. This
endogenously deﬁnes the value b, which is the value of the unemployment beneﬁt which makes the
value of unemployment just equal to zero. Further, workers turn into entrepreneurs with probability
Ω in a given period. Each entrepreneur then draws a cost of opening a vacancy from the CDF,
G. Free entry will imply that only entrepreneurs whose cost of a creating a vacancy is less than or
equal to πv will actually do so. Together this implies that the number of jobs created in a period,
J, can be written as,
J = LΩG(πv),
Rearranging this gives, πv = G−1( J
LΩ). The number of ﬁlled jobs in a period equals φFJ and so










28Recall that equation (13) deﬁnes the reservation productivity for minimum wage jobs as a





) + m (21)
Equation (21) deﬁnes a line in η∗
m - θ space that represents the free entry condition/job creation
condition in the model. Higher values of η∗
m need to be balanced with higher values of πv according
to equation (13). But higher values of πv mean that more potential entrepreneurs enter the market
and create vacancies. This in turn implies higher values of θ. Thus, this schedule is upward sloping.
The other curve needed to determine the equilibrium relates to worker participation decisions.
Recall from equation (18) that,
rVuj =
r + δ
r + δ + ψF
bj +
ψF
r + δ + ψF
E(wj | η > η∗
j)
For the marginal labour force participant, rVuj = 0, and given our assumption that the minimum
wage is relevant for at least one worker, the marginal participant will face η∗
m as the relevant
reservation productivity. Thus, we can re-write equation (18) for this worker as follows,
0 =
r + δ
r + δ + ψF
b +
ψF
r + δ + ψF
E(wj | η > η∗
m) (22)
Based on earlier arguments, the derivative of the right hand side of (22) with respect to η∗
m will
have oﬀsetting components: the increase in the reservation productivity will decrease the probability
of an unemployed worker making a continuing match but it will imply that the expected value of
the match, conditional on it continuing, will be higher. Since there are a continuum of reservation
productivities in the economy, the latter eﬀect seems likely to dominate and thus we expect the
derivative of the right hand side of (22) with respect to η∗
m to be positive. This implies that higher
values of η∗
m need to be balanced with lower values of b to make the equality in (22) hold. In other
words, a higher cut-oﬀ is associated with more people being interested in entering the work force.
This, in turn, implies a larger number of unemployed workers and, thus, a lower value of θ. Thus,
this locus is downward sloping.
The intersection of (21) and (22) determines equilibrium values for η∗
m and θ. An increase in
the minimum wage shifts the job creation locus up as for any given θ (and therefore πv), a higher
reservation productivity is needed to maintain zero proﬁts for the marginal ﬁrm. The participation
curve also shifts up with an increase in the minimum wage as for a given reservation productivity,
an improvement in the minimum wage leads to an increased value to job search and thus more
people entering the labour force. This, in turn implies a decline in θ. Combined these shifts imply
an uncertain impact on η∗
m but a decline in θ. Thus, the equilibrium eﬀects imply a decline in
job creation (hiring) and uncertain eﬀects for layoﬀs. Essentially, the impact of a minimum wage
increase on the equilibrium reservation productivity will reﬂect a ﬁrm’s increased desire to hold
onto matches (since their outside option has decreased in value) but also workers’ increased desire
to terminate matches (because their outside option has improved in value).
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Figure 5: Hiring rates, Low Skilled, 1979−2008Table 1: Mean Retention, Quits, Layoﬀ Rates and Hours Growth, Low Skilled
Retention
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
Overall .9438 .8679 .8399 .9106
Males .9419 .8585 .8585 .9036
Females .9459 .8790 .8514 .9181
Teenagers .8577 .8293 .7985 .8892
Young Adults .9142 .8675 .8402 .9092
Older Adults .9540 .8771 .8513 .9151
Quit
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
Overall .0117 .0257 .0304 .0185
Males .0096 .0226 .0275 .0150
Females .0143 .0293 .0342 .0225
Teenagers .0406 .0474 .0545 .0337
Young Adults .0221 .0315 .0366 .0236
Older Adults .0083 .0184 .0216 .0138
Quit Including Direct Job to Job Transitions
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
Overall .0216 .0521 .0637 .0345
Males .0207 .0528 .0651 .0329
Females .0228 .0512 .0618 .0362
Teenagers .0750 .0876 .1022 .0590
Young Adults .0415 .0623 .0746 .0435
Older Adults .0151 .0399 .0491 .0266
Layoﬀ
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
Overall .0303 .0742 .0894 .0506
Males .0337 .0834 .0975 .0598
Females .0264 .0632 .0789 .0407
Teenagers .0594 .0747 .0894 .0460
Young Adults .0396 .0648 .0788 .0432
Older Adults .0270 .0775 .0931 .0542
Hours Growth
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
Overall -.0030 -.0030 -.0017 -.0050
Males -.0045 -.0051 -.0038 -.0073
Females -.0008 .00010 .0017 -.0020
Teenagers -.0064 -.0056 -.0054 -.0063
Young Adults -.0036 -.0032 -.0013 -.0060
Older Adults -.0028 -.0025 -.0011 -.0046Table 2: Mean Hiring Rate, Low Skilled






Older Adults .0682Table 3: Retention Rate, Low Skilled
Males and Females
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0013 .0354 .0420 .0077
(.0032) (.0075)*** (.0093)*** (.0090)
R-squared .77 .75 .70 .56
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0054 .0408 .0539 -.0033
(.0054) (.0125)*** (.0154)*** (.0155)
lrminlag12m -.0038 -.0037 -.0121 .0159
(.0055) (.0125) (.0154) (.0155)
R-squared .78 .76 .71 .57
Males
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0011 .0366 .0408 .0010
(.0037) (.0094)*** (.0115)*** (.0120)
R-squared .75 .71 .64 .56
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0084 .0445 .0503 .0083
(.0064) (.0157)*** (.0192)*** (.0207)
lrminlag12m -.0073 -.0055 -.0079 .0048
(.0064) (.0157) (.0191) (.0206)
R-squared .76 .72 .65 .56
Females
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0015 .0330 .0415 .0066
(.0037) (.0092)*** (.0121)*** (.0106)
R-squared .68 .64 .59 .36
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0020 .0369 .0555 -.0108
(.0065) (.0154)*** (.0201)*** (.0182)
lrminlag12m .0002 -.0031 -.0160 .0237
(.0065) (.0154) (.0201) (.0181)
R-squared .69 .65 .60 .37
Notes. Dependent variable: proportion of workers on a job in month t who are
still on that job in month t+1. lrmin is the log of the real minimum wage. All
regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number in the at-risk group. The
number of observations is 3,590 in speciﬁcations without a lag and 3,510 in spec-
iﬁcations with a lag. All regressions include a full set of time and province dum-
mies and a dummy equal to one if there was a minimum wage change in the
month. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 4: Retention Rate by Age Group, Low Skilled
15 to 19 Years of Age
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0368 .0391 .0476 -.0011
(.0112)*** (.0145)*** (.0184)*** (.0199)
R-squared .51 .48 .41 .21
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0011 .0123 .0260 -.0269
(.0193) (.0245) (.0309) (.0344)
lrminlag12m .0417 .0310 .0261 .0307
(.0193)** (.0245) (.0309) .0345)
R-squared .51 .47 .41 .21
20 to 24 Years of Age
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0013 .0171 .0270 -.0057
(.0062) (.0109) (.0145)* (.0140)
R-squared .59 .52 .45 .28
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0064 .0304 .0305 .0170
(.0107) (.0186) (.0247) (.0243)
lrminlag12m -.0077 -.0144 -.0040 -.0257
(.0107) (.0186) (.0246) (.0242)
R-squared .59 .53 .46 .28
25 to 59 Years of Age
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0001 .0353 .0383 .0115
(.0031) (.0090)*** (.0113)*** .0109
R-squared .75 .74 .68 .56
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0062 .0460 .0642 -.0091
(.0054) (.0150)*** (.0185)*** (.0188)
lrminlag12m -.0062 -.0088 -.0278 .0283
(.0054) (.0149) (.0185) (.0187)
R-squared .76 .75 .69 .57
Notes. Dependent variable: proportion of workers on a job in month t who are still
on that job in month t+1. lrmin is the log of the real minimum wage. All regres-
sions are weighted by the inverse of the number in the at-risk group. The number of
observations is 3,590 in speciﬁcations without a lag and 3,510 in speciﬁcations with
a lag. All regressions include a full set of time and province dummies and a dummy
equal to one if there was a minimum wage change in the month. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 5: Quits and Layoﬀ Rates, Low Skilled
Quits
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0016 -.0035 -.0024 -.0020
(.0009)* (.0024) (.0032) (.0031)
R-squared .68 .57 .54 .31
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0050 .0046 .0034 .0086
(.0015)*** (.0040) (.0052) (.0054)
lrminlag12m -.0043 -.0101 -.0070 -.0135
(.0015)*** (.0039)** (.0052) (.0054)**
R-squared .68 .57 .54 .31
Quits Including Direct Job to Job Transitions
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0011 -.0177 -.0193 -.0086
(.0013) (.0035)*** (.0047)*** (.0044)**
R-squared .74 .63 .60 .33
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin .0062 -.0016 -.0062 .0123
(.0022)*** (.0058) (.0078) (.0074)
lrminlag12m -.0094 -.0205 -.0172 -.0256
(.0022)*** (.0058)*** (.0078)** (.0074)***
R-squared .74 .63 .59 .33
Layoﬀs
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0060 -.0260 -.0330 -.0051
(.0029)** (.0070)*** (.0084)*** (.0080)
R-squared .79 .81 .78 .65
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin -.0140 -.0404 -.0493 -.0095
(.0050)*** (.0117)*** (.0140)*** (.0139)
lrminlag12m .0088 .0151 .0180 .0027
(.0050) (.0117) (.0140) (.0138)
R-squared .79 .81 .78 .65
Notes. Dependent variable: proportion of workers on a job in month t who leave the
job by each route. lrmin is the log of the real minimum wage. All regressions are
weighted by the inverse of the number in the at-risk group. The number of observa-
tions is 3,590 in speciﬁcations without a lag and 3,510 in speciﬁcations with a lag. All
regressions include a full set of time and province dummies and a dummy equal to one
if there was a minimum wage change in the month. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 6: Impact of a 10% Increase in the Minimum Wage as a Pro-
portion of All Separations, Low Skilled
All Ages
Using Quit1
< 1 Year Tenure All Tenure
Impact Proportion Impact Proportion
Quit -.0031 .12 .0035 -.36
Layoﬀ -.023 .88 -.013 1.36
Total -.026 -.096
Using Quit2 (taking account of reassigning .32 of quit2 to layoﬀs)
< 1 Year Tenure All Tenure
Impact Proportion Impact Proportion
Quit -.0011 .34 -.0016 .13




< 1 Year Tenure All Tenure
Impact Proportion Impact Proportion
Quit -.0016 .07 -.0011 .04
Layoﬀ -.019 .93 -.026 .96
Total -.021 -.027
Using Quit2 (taking account of reassigning .32 of quit2 to layoﬀs)
< 1 Year Tenure All Tenure
Impact Proportion Impact Proportion
Quit -.0011 .39 -.013 .38
Layoﬀ -.017 .61 -.022 .62
Total -.028 -.035Table 7: Hiring Rate and Hours of Work, Low Skilled
Hiring
No Lags
Both Genders Males Females Teenagers Both Genders
lrmin -.0291 -.0408 -.0158 -.0814
(.0054)*** (.0093)*** (.0044)*** (.0154)***
R-squared .63 .65 .60 .49
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin -.0154 -.0129 -.0075 -.0093
(.0092)* (.0159)* (.0075) (.0258)
lrminlag12m -.0176 -.0397 -.0103 -.0989
(.0093)* (.0159)*** (.0076) (.0259)***
R-squared .64 .65 .60 .49
Hours of Work
No Lags
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0002 .0016 .0006 .0039
(.0075) (.0083) (.0095) (.0093)
R-squared .79 .72 ..67 .67
With 1 Year Lag
lrmin -.0063 -.0102 -.0134 -.0033
(.0132) (.0142) (.0160) (.0161)
lrminlag12m .0077 .0147 .0178 .0086
(.0132) (.0141) (.0160) (.0161)
R-squared .79 .72 .67 .67
Notes. Dependent variables: proportion of non-employed workers on a job in month t
who ﬁnd a job in t+1 and the change in average weekly hours. lrmin is the log of the
real minimum wage. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number in the
at-risk group. The number of observations is 3,590 in speciﬁcations without a lag and
3,510 in speciﬁcations with a lag. All regressions include a full set of time and province
dummies and a dummy equal to one if there was a minimum wage change in the month.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 8: Retention, Quits and Layoﬀ Rates with Inﬂation Interaction, Low Skilled
Retention
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0179 .0660 .0738 .0248
(.0041)*** (.0098)*** (.0120)*** (.0121)
inf .0079 .0141 .0149 .0072
(.0013)*** (.0030)*** (.0037)*** (.0039)*
lrmin*inf -.0039 -.0064 -.0064 -.0040
(.0007)*** (.0016)*** (.0020)*** (.0020)***
R-squared .78 .76 .71 .57
Quits
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin .0010 -.0013 .0027 -.0048
(.0011) (.0031) (.0041) (.0042)
inf -.0001 .0011 .0024 -.0011
(.0004) (.0010) (.0013)* (.0013)
lrmin*inf .0002 -.0004 -.0010 .0007
(.0002) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
R-squared .69 .57 .54 .30
Quits Including Direct Job to Job Transitions
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0057 -.0226 -.0222 -.0165
(.0017)*** (.0046)*** (.0062)*** (.0058)***
inf -.0020 -.0021 -.0010 -.0037
(.0005)*** (.0014) (.0019) (.0019)*
lrmin*inf .0014 .0014 .0008 .0023
(.0003)*** (.0008)* (.0010) (.0010)**
R-squared .75 .63 .59 .33
Layoﬀs
All Tenure < 1 Year < 6 Months 6 to 11 Months
lrmin -.0213 -.0570 -.0689 -.0181
(.0038)*** (.0091)*** (.0109)*** (.0108)
inf -.0074 -.0144 -.0171 -.0053
(.0012)*** (.0028)*** (.0034)*** (.0035)
lrmin*inf .0034 .0064 .0074 .0026
(.0006)*** (.0015)*** (.0018)*** (.0018)
R-squared .80 .81 .79 .66
Notes. Dependent variable: proportion of workers on a job in month t who leave the
job by each route. lrmin is the log of the real minimum wage. All regressions are
weighted by the inverse of the number in the at-risk group. The number of observa-
tions is 3,590 in speciﬁcations without a lag and 3,510 in speciﬁcations with a lag. All
regressions include a full set of time and province dummies and a dummy equal to one
if there was a minimum wage change in the month. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.